ptc24: (tickybox)
Peter ([personal profile] ptc24) wrote2012-04-20 10:19 am

The meaning of "knowledge"

Hypothetical:

In Town X, a burglary is reported to the police. They investigate, and their investigation leads to Bob, who has previous convictions for that sort of thing. They find the stolen goods at Bob's house, Bob is questioned, he confesses, it goes to trial, Bob pleads guilty, the jury is convinced by the evidence, and Bob is sentenced accordingly.

In fact, Bob had not committed the burglary. In fact, he had a provable alibi - he was out committing another burglary (of equivalent severity) elsewhere in town at the time. The original burglary was done by a friend of his, and he was just storing the goods at his house. Given that demonstrating his alibi wouldn't have saved him any prison time, and would have involved fingering his accomplices (which would have damaged his standing in the criminal underworld), he felt that the simplest thing to do was to take the rap for the original burglary.

This is all to illustrate a philosophical point about the word "know" (and "knowledge" etc). A poll:

(ETA Note that the previous convictions don't count when I'm asking whether the legal system knew Bob had committed burglary... I meant to ask "...committed burglary on that day" or something similar. This ETA is before anyone but me has answered this, so all the results reflect this ETA)


Open to: Registered Users, detailed results viewable to: All, participants: 9


Did the legal system know that Bob had committed burglary?

View Answers

Yes
1 (12.5%)

No
7 (87.5%)

Was the outcome just?

View Answers

Yes - Bob committed a burglary and served a sentence for burglary, your point?
4 (57.1%)

No - Bob was punished for a crime he did not commit.
2 (28.6%)

I don't believe in punishing people for burglary anyway, so No
1 (14.3%)

Furthermore

View Answers

This is a completely ridiculous hypothetical and the legal system wouldn't have acted that way
0 (0.0%)

This is reasonably realistic, at least in terms of how the legal system acted
2 (25.0%)

Ummmm...
6 (75.0%)


jack: (Default)

[personal profile] jack 2012-04-20 10:18 am (UTC)(link)
I've heard brief mentions of the discussion of what it means to "know" something.

However, to me, the mistake seems to be assuming that because we have a word "know", that it maps cleanly to a relevant philosophical concept (that fulfils all the expectations of "something you can reason with", "something you have good reason to think true", etc, etc). It seems more likely that there is (at best) a number of overlapping concepts that "know" describes well when they coincide, but people would disagree about when they don't.

So I realise this is one of the edge cases, but I'm not sure the answer is "yes" or "no"... :)
rochvelleth: (Default)

[personal profile] rochvelleth 2012-04-20 11:26 am (UTC)(link)
In Spanish, you use a different verb for knowing a fact (saber) from what you use for knowing a person (conocer). So in some languages there is already a primary devision between concepts that we group together under the umbrella term 'knowing'.

(Obviously Spanish is not the only language in which this is the case, it's just the one that comes most easily to my mind because I've spent time studying it.)

P.S. This should probably spark a discussion of whether you can ever really know a person :)
jack: (Default)

[personal profile] jack 2012-04-20 11:40 am (UTC)(link)
True, but I think people accept that "know a person", "know a skill", "know a fact", etc are different. I don't think anyone would seriously suggest that the justice system would have made the acquaintance of Bob committing a burglary, or have the skill of Bob committing a burglary -- I think everyone is wondering whether it can be said to know the fact of Bob committing a burglary. I am curious if there's languages that break down "know a fact" further.
rochvelleth: (Default)

[personal profile] rochvelleth 2012-04-20 12:02 pm (UTC)(link)
Yes, I was trying to think of further breakings down of the concept in other languages but didn't come up with anything useful :) There are some technical ways in which Greek philosophers talk about knowledge and truth and so forth using various technical vocabulary, but that's not quite the same.

I'm definitely not sure that I know any language where 'knowing something that really has happened because you have been convinced by evidence that it has happened' is distinguished from 'thinking you know that something has happened because you have been convinced by evidence that it has happened when in fact it hasn't happened but something else equivalent has, with that result that you sort of know something that has happened for which you didn't have any direct evidence, and where you will never realise that this isn't knowledge type A' :)
jack: (Default)

[personal profile] jack 2012-04-20 12:13 pm (UTC)(link)
'thinking you know that something has happened because you have been convinced by evidence that it has happened when in fact it hasn't happened but something else equivalent has, with that result that you sort of know something that has happened for which you didn't have any direct evidence, and where you will never realise that this isn't knowledge type A' :)

:)

Yeah, not really expect that :) The closest I can think of is when people use varying emphases and modifiers, like "I know it, I just KNOW it" means "I have a strong feeling but no evidence" or "You can't KNOW that" means "it's pretty certain that it is, but it's always possible you've misinterpreted it"
rochvelleth: (Default)

[personal profile] rochvelleth 2012-04-20 12:31 pm (UTC)(link)
Ah, yes, they're good e.g.s. Unfortunately, they also involve breaking linguistics :) When you talk about a language having different words for different concepts, you're looking at good old fashioned etymologies and traditional semantics and so on. But when you talk about people meaning something different by the way they emphasise a word, you're into the field of pragmatics (which is all about why things mean what they mean in context), which is a relatively new concept[1]. Obviously when talking about philosophical and to some extent psychological aspects, this is perfectly justified. It's just a by-product that my head responds by dividing the two concepts and keeping them separate :)

[1] A case in point re pragmatics: 'relatively new concept' means something a bit different to a classicist like me from what it might mean to e.g. a modern linguist ;)
rochvelleth: (Default)

[personal profile] rochvelleth 2012-04-21 12:13 pm (UTC)(link)
Yes exactly, thereabouts - this is very late by my internal timeline :)

[identity profile] vyvyan.livejournal.com 2012-04-21 09:15 am (UTC)(link)
Have you ever come across evidential markers in Quechua? I once had a colleague who studied Quechua in Ecuador for a while, and gave a talk in Cambridge about the overt marking of one's degree of certainty in a proposition. We all thought it would be a good language to require politicians to use :-)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quechua_languages#Evidentiality
rochvelleth: (Default)

[personal profile] rochvelleth 2012-04-21 12:12 pm (UTC)(link)
Oh that's fascinating - thank you for that link. My experience of Quechua has been very fleeting (one MPhil seminar, and a snatch in Indy 4, etc!), and I didn't know about the evidentiality markers at all. What a wonderful system!

[personal profile] hoiho 2012-04-20 01:25 pm (UTC)(link)
And French has connaƮtre and savoir.